AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF MONETIZATION OF FRINGE BENEFITS POLICY ON THE NIGERIA FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE; A CASE OF THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, ABUJA

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TABLE OF CONTENT

Title Page                         …                    …                    ….                   I          

Approval Page                      …           …                    ….                   Ii         

Dedication                                …                    …                    …                    iii       

Acknowledgement                  …                    …                    ….                   V        

Table of Content                   …                    …                    …                    vi        

Abstract                                 …                    …                    ….                   Viii    

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1            Background to the Study              –           –           –           –           –           1

1.2             Statement of the Problem              –           –           –           –           5

1.3             Objectives of the Study       –       –           –           –           –           –           7

1.4             Significance of the Study    –  –           –           –           –           –           8

1.5             Scopes and Limitation of the Study        –           –           –           8

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1             Literature Review    –           –           –           –           –           –           11

2.1.1         The Meaning of Monetization of Fringe Benefits     –           –           12

2.1.2         The Provisions of the monetization of Policy     –          –           15

1.1.3         The Implementation of the Monetization Policy-      –  19

2.1.4         Effects of the Monetization Policy on the Public Servants       20

2.1.5         Challenges and Prospects of the Monetization Policy   –  –           24

2.1.6         Summary of the Literature Review               –           –           26

2.1.7         Gap in the Literature           –            –           –           –           –           27

2.2             Theoretical Framework       –            –           –           –           –           28

2.3             Hypotheses   –           –           –                  –           –           –           –           34

2.4             Operationalization of Key Concepts   –           –           –           –           34

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH PROCEDURE AND STUDY AREA

3.1             Research Design       –   –           —         –           –           –           –           37

3.2             Method of Data Collection –               –           –           –           –           37

3.3             Validation of the Instrument          –              –           –           38

3.4             Population of the Study      –            –           –           –           –           39

3.5             Sample Size   –           –           –           –           –           –           –           39

3.6             Sampling Procedure –          –           –           –           –           –           40

3.7             Method of Data presentation and Analysis        –           –           41

3.8             Study Area (Nigeria Federal Ministry of Education)     –              41

3.8.1         Introduction to the Nigeria Federal Ministry of Education-     41

3.8.2         Structural Organization of the Ministry Of Education   –           43

3.8.4         The Functions of the Ministry Of Education       –    –           –           48

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1.0         Data Presentation and Analysis         –           –           –           –           45

4.1.1         Presentation of Data on Background Characteristics  –           51

4.1.2         Presentation of Data from the Questionnaires    –           –           56

4.1.3         Test of Hypothesis One       —           –           –           –           59

4.1.4         Test of Hypothesis Two      –         –           –           –           –           64

4.1.5         Test of Hypothesis three         –           –           –           –           68

4.2             Findings                  –           –           –           –           –           –           70

4.3             Discussion of Findings              –           –           –           –           –           71

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

  •          Summary          –           –  
    •          Recommendations                             –           –           –           83
    •          Conclusion       –                   –           –           –           –           –           85

Bibliography

Appendices

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. I:  Organizational Chart/Organogram of the Federal Ministry of Education      – 47

Fig 2:  Sex Distribution of Respondents   –    –           –           –           –           52

Fig 3: Marital Distribution of Respondents                –           –           –           53

Fig 4: Age Distribution of Respondents   –                –           –           –           54

Fig 5: Educational Distribution of Respondents –          –           –           –           55

Fig 6: Rank/Grade/Status Distribution of Respondents –      –           –           56

APPENDICES

App. I:            Research Questionnaire
LIST OF TABLES

Table I:  The Structure of Monetization policy            .                   ….       18

Table 2. Distribution of the question          

Table 4.1: Gender Distribution of Respondents        ….                   ….       52

Table 4.2: Marital Status of Respondents                        ….       53

Table 4.3: Age Range of Respondents                      ….                   ….       54

Table 4.4: Highest Educational Qualification of Respondents               55

Table 4.5: Grade / status of Respondents             ….                 ….       56       

Table 4.6: The Distribution of Respondents on whether there is a relationship between the continued inefficiency of the Nigerian civil service with the monetization of the fringe benefits of the Nigerian Civil servants    ….       57

Table 4.7: Calculation of X² test on data of table 4.6, which states that there is a relationship between the continued inefficiency of the Nigerian civil service with the monetization of the fringe benefits of the Nigerian Civil servants       .…       ….       60

Table 4.8: The Distribution of Respondents on Whether there is a significant relationship between monetization of fringe benefits of Nigerian public servants and the socio-economic needs          –           –            –           –           –           –           –           –           –           62

Table 4.9: Calculation of X² Test on Data of Table 4.8 Which States that there is a significant relationship between monetization of fringe benefits of Nigerian Civil servants and their socio-economic needs      ….                        ….                   ….                   ….       65

Table 4.10: The distribution of respondents on whether there is a correlation between the monetization of Nigerian civil servants’ fringe benefits and the increased cost of governance and unnecessary pressure on the national resources                     ….       66

Table 4.11: Calculation of X² Test on Data of Table 4.10 which states that there is a correlation between the monetization of Nigerian civil servants’ fringe benefits and the increased cost of governance and unnecessary pressure on the national resources     -69

ABSTRACT

The study assesses the effect of monetization of fringe benefits policy on the Nigeria federal civil service; using the federal ministry of education, Abuja as study area. Anchored on the elite theory, it seeks to find out if the monetization of fringe benefits has met the socio-economic needs of the Nigerian Civil Servants; examine the impact of monetization of fringe benefits on the job performance of the Nigerian Civil Servants; and ascertain whether the monetization of fringe benefits policy actually reduced cost of governance and unnecessary pressure on national resources. The study utilized the survey research design and data for this study were generated through primary and secondary sources of data collection. The primary source of data collection was based on the distribution of questionnaires to the 366 sample size utilized.  These respondents were randomly selected amongst the staff of the Federal Ministry of Education, Abuja, using the Yamene 5% method. Data for this study were presented in quantitative and tabular format showing frequency and percentages of responses, hence subdivided into two sections –section A and B. Percentage and frequency distribution were utilized to analyze the data generated from the first section of the questionnaire and the chi-square (X²) test was utilized for the analysis of data generated from the second part of the questionnaire to draw inferences. Based on the assumptions (hypotheses), several findings were made, such as that the Nigerian Civil Service is still inefficient in spite of the reform, and that the continued inefficiency is linked to the fact that the policy impacted negatively on the socio-economic needs of the Civil service; and that the cost of governance in Nigeria has not reduced in spite of the policy. On the basis of the above findings, recommendations were made such as  that that the government should ensure that the interest of the civil servants are protected in the policy implementation of the policy as was adumbrated in the policy objectives to ensure that the benefits of the policy really gets to those targeted unless of course the policy is for the elite by making, by balancing the desire to sell off the government quarters at a high rate and making it affordable to the civil servants whom the policy encourages to own their own houses.

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

1.1     Background to the Study

The long military rule in Nigeria, few years after independence in 1960, left its toll on almost every aspect of the Nigerian life, such that social infrastructures, economy, public services, rural development, etc. were adversely affected hence, there was total infrastructural decay, and the economy was comatosed, as the public service was inefficient and corrupt, leading to wastages in government (Onu, 2007).

But an array of hope came in 1999 with the arrival of new democratic government when, in reaction to the general hash prevailing conditions in the country, the then Obasanjo’s administration embraced reforms in all sectors of the economy; and such reforms included the local government’s reform, re-capitalization of banks, trade liberalization, private sector development, anti-corruption, institutional reforms, and the public sector reforms. According to Suleiman (2009), the civil service is the first component of the public sector followed by the bureaucracy.

However, of all the reforms, the public sector reform was the centre of attraction as it was the major instrument used by government to implement its policies. This notion of centrality of the public sector reform is based on the consciousness of the nature and importance of the public service as a determinant of success or failure of the administration in power, by the administration.  Thus, on the realisation of the centrality of the strategic role of increased and enhanced performance of the public sector, the monetisation of fringe benefit policy was made as an enviable public sector reform (Okoye, et al, 2012).

Much as it is obvious that incentive structures propel enhanced improvements in management and performance of the public sector, monetization of fringe benefits in the nation’s public sector became a necessity due to the rising cost of governance and pressure on national resources arising mostly from the benefits-in-kind that the various tiers of government have to provide to the civil servants.

This policy seeks to replace fringe benefits that were previously provided in kind with monetary allowances, and the consequent withdrawal of government from the maintenance cost obligation that attended these benefits in line with current global trend in private and public sectors of the modern government (Okwuosa, 2004).

Historically, these fringe benefits were carryover from the colonial era, when the colonial government provided the colonial administrators residential accommodation, transportation facilities, gardeners, medical services, etc, which they did not have to pay for because they were entitled to hazard allowances by their home government, but then, they were fewer in number such that their total package was negligible when compared to the income which they extracted in favour of their home government (Aluko, 2005).

However, after the independence in 1960, the indigenous high cadre public servants who took over the reins of office from them also inherited these fringe benefits, but as time went on, coupled with the astronomical increase in the number of public sector employees due to Nigerianisation policy, the cost of providing these fringe benefits became unbearable to the government; as little was left for funding capital projects by the government. But, the problem assumed higher level of complexity when it became obvious that these benefits were not provided prudently, as it was largely abused by the public servants and their wards. For instance, instead of having one official car, some public servants had up to three official cars attached to them whose drivers are paid by the government and whose fuelling and maintenance costs are taken care of by the government. Again, officers on transfer, say, from Lagos to Abuja still kept their official quarters in Lagos. More so, telephones that were maintained by government were abused by the wards of these officials (Okoye, et al, 2012).

Thus, the provisions of fringe benefits to civil servants continued to consume enormous resources from the public purse and as such impacted negatively on the national economy (Izueke, 2008:3). What is more worrisome is the fact that although the civil servants constitute about 20% of the population of Nigeria, it takes up to 60-70% of the annual national budget expenditure to maintain them (Aluko, 2005:2). The burden having exacerbated until 2002, the then president, Olusegun Obasanjo, in his 2003 inaugural address stated “the cost of running government at all levels currently gulps a disproportionate amount of our revenue”. And in reaction to the identified wastage made manifest in high cost of administration and in search of efficiency, the government opted for monetisation of those fringe benefits hitherto enjoyed by public sector employees at various strata because the monetization policy was intended to minimize waste, misuse and abuse of public facilities, and achieve efficiency of government. The monetization policy was given legal backing by the political, public and judicial office holders Salaries and Allowances Act of 2002, which was extended to the civil servants, from 1st July, 2003.

A decade after the inauguration of such lofty government policy by the Obasanjo-led government, the need arises to critically assess the effect such policy has had on the economy and the civil servants, especially those in the ministry of education whose pattern of office-related benefits were replaced with monetary stipends, especially on their job performance and enrichment as well as on their socio-economic needs as social and economic beings. This need could be looked at from the standpoint of the perennial face-off between the government and the academic unions in the country such as the Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU), Non Academic staff of Nigerian Universities (NASU), Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities (SSANU), and Academic staff Union of Nigerian Polytechnics (ASUP) etc.   

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF MONETIZATION OF FRINGE BENEFITS POLICY ON THE NIGERIA FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE; A CASE OF THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, ABUJA