ABSTRACT
Consensually united elites are said to be very rare and as such limit the possibility for the spread of liberal democracy across the world. In Africa, Ghana presents itself as a case in point, not only because it is one of the most democratic countries in Africa but also the fact that political elites have been accorded the force behind this success. The study therefore examines the place of elite consensus in Ghana’s political landscape by examining the political parties, elections, the legislature and national development planning in the fourth republic. This analysis was made based on a wealth of knowledge provided by numerous scholars on the topic of elite consensus and how this concept is connected to democratic development. Within the Ghanaian political dispensation, based on some operational benchmarks, this study adopted self-perceptions expressed in qualitative, in-depth interviews with a limited number of political party executives, think-tanks, parliamentarians, civil servants and National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) officials. The study found out that political elites in Ghana are very united and as such depicts a horizontal integration of elites as explained by Higley and Burton. This has accounted for Ghana’s envious democratic strides. However, this consensus is only on issues affecting elites and not the citizens which are particularly indicative in Ghana’s legislature and national development planning since the start of the fourth republic. This finding goes against Higley and Burton’s vertically integrated elitism, which suggests a great cohesion between elites and the masses. This then confirms the hypothesis of the study which states that Ghana lacks an enduring elite consensus which has negatively affected national development. In light of these conclusions, the study prescribes some remedies in solving Ghana’s deficits on elite consensus towards national development in the long-run. They include having a third force in Ghana’s political arena, some constitutional amendments, effective civic education, procuring a national agenda on national development planning and effective conflict resolution mechanisms.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background to the Study
Over the years, the role of the state has evolved from the mere source of territorial protection (internal and external) to a system which provides inclusiveness and opportunities (economic, social, political and cultural) for its citizens (Tanzi, 1997). It has led to the evolution of democracy, a form of government focused on the people and where citizens are made masters of not only their destinies but also, the source of power through which leaders gain legitimacy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991).
Today, democracy has gained massive support as the ideal governance system in resolving the political and socio-economic challenges of countries worldwide (Kooijmans, 2018). This is in comparison to a government by the few (for example, the Communist Party in China and Cuba) or by a single person (such as the dictatorship of the Kim family in North Korea) (Pearson Higher Education, 2010). To many political thinkers, democracy best protects human rights and produces rational policies (Pearson Higher Education, 2010).
Nevertheless, democracy remains an aspiration rather than a finished product, according to many scholars (Pearson Higher Education, 2010). For this reason, democracy must follow three major benchmarks. These benchmarks include:
- popular sovereignty (government policies reflect the wishes of the people, government leaders are selected in competitive elections, elections are free and fair, people participate in the political process, high-quality information is available and majority rules);
- political equity (each person being of equal intrinsic value as other human beings, equal protection) and;
- political liberty(basic freedoms essential to the formation and expression of majority opinion and its translation into public policies) (Pearson Higher Education, 2010, pp. 7- 11).
Scholars like Higley and Burton have tried to explain the dilemma of unequal democracies across the world. A popular theory is the structural and actor-centric approaches, postulated by Higley and Burton (1989). The structural approach considers a country’s wealth as the leading factor for democracies whiles the actor-centric approach, on the other hand, highlights the process of elite bargaining and strategic interaction (Higley & Burton, 1989).
The “Third Wave” of democratization, a phrase which Huntington (1991) uses to describe the global trend that saw more than 60 countries undergo a democratic transition in the late 20th century, seems to support the actor-centric idea that democracy can thrive in all kinds of settings. This was particularly evident in Africa, a continent inhabiting some of the poorest countries and once seen as “unlikely democratizers” (Berman, 2007).
Military regimes and single-party rule characterised post-colonial rule in Africa. The movement from authoritarianism in Africa acquired momentum from trends and changes on the international stage. Nonetheless, this situation in itself did not change the trajectory of events. Thirty-nine (39) heads of state were referred to as autocrats by 1990 (Baker, 1998). They had truncated the human rights of their citizens and had put a lid on opposition and dissent, even within their own party circles. More so, there was the abolishment of the individual constitutions of independent African states and those perceived to be opposed to the ruling government were abused, arrested and detained without trial. By 1997, nineteen (19) of such leaders had been ousted and yet twenty (20) of them still relished power (Baker, 1998). Out of the twenty (20), seventeen (17) were democratically elected although some of the elections were contested; two
- lost the elections and orchestrated comebacks through coups d’état while the last one, Mswati III, King of Swaziland, is a monarch whose monarchy remained resolute (Baker, 1998). The
nineteen (19) leaders ousted, were dislodged either through a coup or an election. Some, in addition, were assassinated and yet others escaped rebel attacks.
In recent years, elites have been regarded as an inherent feature of modern societies (Englelstad, 2010). The legitimacy of elites is indisputably a key requirement in every democracy (Kaina, 2009, p. 400). Ideally, elites must embrace democratic values, rule in conformity with the preferences of the electorate, and be demographically representative (Hoffmann-Lange, 1986). Sadly, they fall short of these high expectations in reality. Nonetheless, with several empirical studies on regime types, it is reasonable to embrace the idea that elites in democracies edge closer to these values than elites in non-democratic states.
In a series of publications, Higley and Burton (2006); Higley, et al. (1991); Field & Higley (1980) advanced a comprehensive typology of elite structures and matching regime types. Three ideal types have been distinguished by them. These include:
- Consensually united elites
- Ideologically united elites
- Disunited elites.
Consensually united elites are made distinctive by “dense and interlocked networks of communication and influence” (Higley et al., 1991, p. 36). The interaction structure within, “provides all-important elites with access to central decision-making” (Higley et al., 1991, p. 36). Using social network analysis, there have been empirical evidence of this structure in Western democracies such as Germany, Australia and the United States of America (Osei, 2014). Also, elites within this structure share the basic norms and values of political conduct and acknowledge bargaining as an acceptable mode of conduct. This consensus on values does not automatically mean agreement on particular issues. Instead, on the rules of the game, in simpler words, elites
must agree to disagree. According to John Higley and Michael Burton, liberal democracy is only possible with a consensually united elite (2006, p. 2).
Ideologically united elites, on the other hand, are heavily centralised and unified by a distinct ideology (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 12). Such structures are usually stable but unrepresentative systems, like totalitarian regimes or theocracies. Examples of these regimes include Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, the People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong and North Korea under the Kim dynasty (Sampaolo, 2016). Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe and Eritrea under Isaias Afewerki are given as examples in Africa (Drezner, 2003; Kelley, 2015).
On the contrary, disunited elites are neither characterised by dense communication networks nor a major agreement on the political norms of conduct. Elites here are described as “weakly integrated” and as such always form unstable regimes that can be representative on varying scales (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 19). Present-day Cameroon is given as an example (International Crisis Group, 2010).
Scholars like Cammack (1990) and Borchert (2010) have criticised Higley and Burton’s concept, indicating that the views and roles of non-elites (masses) in these structures receive little attention. To them, the mere existence of elites refutes the idea of equality, which is a fundamental feature of democracy (Borchert, 2010, p. 24). This argument adds to the larger debate on the relationship between vertical and horizontal integration.
There are two dimensions pivotal to the relationship between elites and regimes. These are horizontal integration and vertical integration (Putnam, 1976; Hoffmann-Lange, 1992, p. 35; Schmidt, 2004). Broadly speaking, there is always some tension between vertical and horizontal integration (Kaina, 2009, p. 409). Horizontal integration portrays the interrelationship between
elites and the level of cooperation amongst themselves. Vertical Integration, on the other hand, deals with the relations between elites and the masses (Kaina, 2009).
As described by Higley and Burton, a horizontally integrated elite structure enhances mutual understanding between elites and presents them with a “common language” established on akin experiences in their socialisation ( Higley and Burton, 2006 as cited in Kaina, 2009, p. 480f). This elite freedom fosters effective political decision-making but may, in the same vein, broaden the gap between political representatives and the electorates. On the other hand, strong vertical integration makes elites more representative and accountable to their electorates but could block political compromises and hamper the decision-making process (Kaina, 2009, p. 480f).
For the proper functioning of any democratic system, both dimensions are imperative. On this account, several scholars have advocated for the inclusion of both horizontal and vertical integration in the examination of elite structures and regimes types (Schmidt, 2004; Roustetsaari, 2007).
As discussed above, Higley and Burton assert that a consensually united elite is a prerequisite condition for liberal democracy (Higley & Burton, 2006). Even though the authors fail to discuss the meaning of liberal democracy in that book, their application of the concept implies that it is synonymous with “consolidated democracy”, a concept they had used in their previous publication (Higley & Gunter, 1992). Though consolidation is a contested term, it can be inferred as “the process by which democracy becomes the only game in town, a development which cannot be easily reversed” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 26).
In Africa, this depicts just a handful of countries (Daloz, 2003, p. 271). Ghana falls within this bracket, not because it records huge scores in the Freedom House index, but the fact that it has
passed Huntington’s two-turnover test (if two peaceful turnovers occur after the founding elections), which is mostly seen as a benchmark for successful consolidation (Osei, 2014).
Statement of the Research Problem
It has been argued that the Ghanaian democratic scene in the fourth republic exemplifies a commendable model with regards to the role of elite consensus towards democratic consolidation and national development (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Throup, 2011; Whitfield, 2009; Gyamfi- Boadi, 2009). Ghana’s present democratic dispensation is a case in point. Ever since the inception of the fourth republic, Ghana has had seven peaceful and successive electoral cycles, deemed one of the best in Africa (Frempong, 2017).
Also, the practice of not only an active multiparty system, but the three turnovers and peaceful alternations of power between the two dominant parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is one to savour (Graham, Gyampo, Pamphilious, & Yobo, 2017). In addition, Ghana’s three turnovers of power in the fourth republic, even surpasses Huntington’s (1991) two-turnover test, which says that consolidation of democracy occurs if “the party or group that takes power in the initial election and at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election”. It is, therefore, not surprising that Ghana has been adjudged the fifth most democratic country in Africa (Gwaambuka, 2018 ). Moreover, elite consensus in Ghana is said to be one which transcends the period before, during and the aftermath of elections (Frempong, 2017). Generally speaking, election outcomes in Africa are mostly open to heated conflicts between winners and losers with some popular examples of violent post-electoral crisis including, Cote d’Ivoire in 2001 and Kenya in 2007
(Osei, 2014). However, not all politicians are “dying to win” as Mueller (2011) reveals. The aftermath of the 1992 and 2012 presidential elections in Ghana was evidence of such a claim, particularly with that of the 2012 presidential election where the losing party, the NPP, used the constitution by petitioning the Supreme Court when it felt the election was rigged (Frempong, 2017). Even when the Supreme Court ruled against the NPP, the flag bearer, Akufo-Addo, quickly accepted defeat though he disagreed. This “reflects the mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules of the electoral game” as Frempong puts it (2017, p. 267).
More so, scholars like Anja Osei believes Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana have developed a high level of trust amongst each other and thus are consensually united (Osei, 2015). This, to her, not only supports Higley and Burton’s claim that elite integration is conducive to stable democracies but also braces the idea of the actor-centric model of democracy (Osei, 2015). This again goes further to prove a high depth of horizontal elite integration as described by Higley and Burton (2006).
