TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page – – – – – – – – – i
Declaration – – – – – – – – – ii
Certification – – – – – – – – – iii
Dedication – – – – – – – – – iv
Acknowledgement – – – – – – – – v
Table of Contents – – – – – – – – vi
List of Tables – – – – – – – – – ix
Abstract – – – – – – – – – x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Background of the study – – – – – – 1
Statement of the Problem – – – – – – 2
Objectives of the Study – – – – – – 3
Research Question – – – – – – – 3
Research Hypotheses – – – – – – – 3
Significance of the Study – – – – – – 4
Scope and limitation of the Study – – – – – 4
Operational Definition of Terms – – – – – 5
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Conceptual Framework – – – – – – 6
2.1.1 Board of Directors – – – – – – – 6
2.1.2 CEO and chairman Duality – – – – – – 7
2.1.3 Chief executive officer tenure – – – – – 9
2.1.4 CEO Importance – – – – – – – 9
2.1.5 CEO turnover – – – – – – – 11
2.1.6 CEO succession – – – – – – – 12
2.1.7 Overall CEO Characteristics – – – – – – 13
2.1.8 Profitability – – – – – – – – 17
2.1.9 Measurement tools of profitability – – – – – 18
2.1.10 Return on asset (ROA) – – – – – – 19
2.1.11 Significance of Profitability – – – – – – 19
2.2 Theoretical Framework – – – – – – 20
2.2.1 Agency theory – – – – – – – 20
2.2.2 Stewardship theory – – – – – – – 22
2.2.3 Entrechment theory – – – – – – – 24
2.2.4 Stakeholder theory – – – – – – – 25
2.2.5 The upper Echelons theory – – – – – – 26
2.3 Empirical Framework – – – – – – 28
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction – – – – – – – – 31
3.1 Research Design – – – – – – – 31
3.2 Population of the Study – – – – – – 31
3.3 Sample Size – – – – – – – – 32
3.4 Sampling Technique – – – – – – 32
3.5 Sources of Data Collection – – – – – – 33
3.6 Model Specification – – – – – – – 33
3.7 Data Analysis technique – – – – – – 34
3.8 Measurement of variable – – – – – – 34
CHAPTER FOUR DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
4.1 Descriptive Statistics – – – – – – – 35
4.2 Correlation Analysis – – – – – – – 36
4.3 Presentation of Results – – – – – – 37
4.4 Discussion of Findings – – – – – – 38
4.5 Hypothesis Testing – – – – – – – 38
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction – – – – – – – – 39
5.2 Summary of the Findings – – – – – – 39
5.3 Conclusion – – – – – – – – 40
5.4 Recommendation – – – – – – – 40
5.5 Suggestion for Further Research – – – – – 41
REFERENCES – – – – – – – 42
APPENDICES – – – – – – –
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1: Summary of descriptive statistics – – – – 36
Table 4.2: Correlation matrix – – – – – – – 36
Table 4.3: Radom effect panel model estimates – – – – 37
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background of the study
In a typical corporate setting, a CEO is analogous to the captain of a ship with ultimate authority vested in him by the board of directors of the firm. During the period he heads the firm, it is expected that he would render his services as a fiduciary of the shareholders. By virtue of being in the role of a fiduciary, he would be expected to take wise decisions which benefits the firm in long/short term and the stakeholders of the firm become well off.
As per Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) paradigm of CEO tenure seasons, the temporal characteristics associated with CEO tenure can affect firm performance. Primarily, the paradigm is based on the premise that‘there are discernible phases, or seasons, within an executive’s tenure in a position, and those seasons give rise to distinct patterns of executive attention, behavior, and ultimately, organizational performance’. Depending on the CEO’s life cycle seasons, CEO tenure can have both positive and negative effects on firm performance (Miller and Shamsie, 2001). For most of the jobs there is a tenure during which an individual is most productive. In the corporate world, a CEO is appointed by the board of directors, who in turn is elected by the owners (shareholders) of the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996), to render his services as the head of the management team to steer the company towards its objective (which in most cases is implicitly assumed to be the shareholder wealth maximization SWM1) by increasing the market price of outstanding shares, however a company can be registered for any legal objectivelike customer satisfaction, profit maximization, generating employment, manufacture good quality products etc. not to mention SWM may be one of them. A CEO gets to utilize the resources (human and materials) of the company and has the decision making authority over them by the virtue of the power vested in him by the owners of the company. The CEO, in consultation with his executives is expected to make decisions in the best interest of the company, decisions that would send positive signals to the market, existing and potential investors about the future of the company.
There are incidences where CEOs did admit that quitting was indeed a good idea after a certain time period because they virtually ran out of ideas and it was befitting in the interest of the firm and its stakeholders to appoint someone else as the new CEO rather than continuing with them.CEO tenure, unlike some public sector executive job does not have a pre-defined age of retirement.
A CEO gets appointed and reappointed by the board based on his merits, which is the reason that there are examples of CEO tenures ranging from a few months to close to 50 years.
Statement of the problem
The current global national economy realities indicates that the corporate economy environment is becoming harsher, competition is getting tougher coupled with the increasingly complex demands of the various stakeholders. Due to the above facts several manufacturing firms have gone down in their value; Some as a result of inexperienced Chief executive officer (CEOs) who acts as head of management.
In recent years, there has been a debate in both the business press and among legal scholars about the usefulness of term limits for chief executive officers (CEOs) of manufacturing firms in Nigeria. At the heart of this debate is the question whether an optimal CEO tenure exists. To answer this question requires an understanding of the costs and benefits that ariseover a CEO’s time in office as well as the determinants of this cost-benefit relation. This study, examines the relation between CEO tenure and firm value to address these issues. Results improve our understanding of why and to which extent CEOs tenure matters.
Objectives of the study
The major purpose of this study is to examine the usefulness of term limits for chief executive officers (CEOs). Specifically this study aims to achieve the following objectives;
To examine the relationship between CEO tenure and profitability of manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
To investigate the relationship between CEO tenure and Return on asset of manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
1.4 Research questions
The following research questions were developed to guide the researcher in achieving the objectives of this study;
What is the relationship between CEO tenure and profitability of manufacturing firms in Nigeria?
Ii What is the relationship between CEO tenure and Return on asset of manufacturing firms in Nigeria?
