CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a comparative analysis of William James and Richard Rorty on the pragmatists‟ conception of truth. I will argue that Rorty‟s version of truth is similar to James‟s, contrary to the claim that Rorty deviates from James‟s conception of truth, and that Rorty remains a Jamesian.1 James (1907) argues that the claim that something is true refers to what is useful in our thinking (p.222). In Truth and progress; Philosophical papers, Rorty claims to be advancing or upholding the traditional conception of the pragmatic truth held by James (p.3). Yet, Rorty (1998) argues that although “there is obviously a lot to be said about justification of various beliefs, there may be little to say about truth (p.19)”. However, not everyone will agree with Rorty‟s claim of being a Jamesian. Arguing this position are Jason M. Boffetti, Scott Campbell, Hilary Putnam, Md A. Razzaque, Cheryl Misak and Abraham Edel. I will at this point review the claims of the aforementioned.
Boffetti (2004) argues that Rorty‟s notion of truth is a departure from James‟s account of truth. This is because James‟s has nothing to do with a difference between community and isolated truth, whereas Rorty‟s does (p.612). Again, it is Boffetti‟s view that James‟s account of truth portrays his radical empiricism, whereas Rorty‟s assertion of a notion of truth is devoid of radical empiricism (p.608). Radical empiricism is James‟s epistemological doctrine which expands on the traditional conception of empiricism.2 In furthering his notion of radical
1 Jamesian refers to one who subscribes to James‟s philosophical views. For example, Boffetti in his paper, “Rorty‟s Nietzschean Pragmatism: A Jamesian Response,” discusses William James‟s views on truth, religion and politics. He calls himself a Jamesian. However the word Jamesian in this thesis is limited to a person who agrees with James‟s pragmatic notion of truth.
2 Traditional empiricism here refers to the kind of empiricism espoused especially by the three British empiricist; John Lock, George Berkeley and David Hume. Lockean empiricism boils down to the idea of sensation and reflection whereas the Berkeleyean empiricism centers on perception and ideas, and Humean empiricism talks about impressions and ideas.
empiricism, James (1904) argues that “… the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system” (p.534) (italics by James). Also, Misak (2011) claims that James‟s radical empiricism is the notion that all inquiry commence with and advances on experience (p.866). James‟s radical empiricism is grounded in his pragmatic conception of truth and the principle of pure experience.3 In James‟s view, the idea of experience goes beyond what traditional empiricism articulates as experience. Also, James claims that his pragmatic notion of truth is a step towards the buildup of his radical empiricism. Boffetti regards Rorty‟s conception of truth as non-empiricists philosophy. To argue this point Boffetti claims:
For James, as a radical empiricist, truth is something that is “found” in the given structure of reality as an attribute of all true things and is accessible by all thinking beings because we all have access to the ground of “pure experience”, even if we encounter it in various ways. It is in this way that James remains an empiricist, and for this reason, it is impossible to see James’s philosophical project as the same radical transition that Rorty has in mind (2004; 609).
