TABLE OF CONTENTS
Content Page
Title Page i
Certification ii
Dedication iii
Acknowledgments iv
Abstract vi
Table of Contents vii
List of Tables x
List of Figures xiii
Acronyms xiv
Appendices xvii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background to the Study 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem 4
1.3 Objective of the Study 5
1.4 Research Questions 5
1.5 Hypotheses 6
1.6 Justification for the Study 6
1.7 Scope of the Study 7
1.8 Operational Definition of Terms 9
1.9 Research Report Outline 10
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 11
2.1 Introduction 11
2.2 Conceptual Model 11
2.3 Internal Security (IS) of Eastern Nigeria and the Nigerian State 40
2.4 Causes of Internal Insecurity in Nigeria 68
2.5 National Government’s Mechanisms of Internal Security
Provisioning (ISP) and Internal Security Management (ISM) 72
2.6 The Citizenry’s Means of Internal Security Provisioning (ISP) and
Internal Security Management (ISM) 109
2.7 Theoretical Framework 115
2.8 Gaps in Literature 133
CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY (WT) AND PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) IN NIGERIA 136
3.1 Introduction 136
3.2 Weapons Technology in Pre-independence Nigeria 136
3.3 Weapons Technology in Post-independence Nigeria 142
3.4 Evidences of Progress in Weapons’ Technology Development and
Circulation in the Post-civil-war Years 150
3.5 Modes of Acquisition, Circulation, and Application of Weapons
Technology in Nigeria 154
3.6 Implications of Advancement of Weapons Technology and
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) for Internal
Security (IS) in Nigeria 158
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 164
4.1 Introduction 164
4.2 Research Design 164
4.3 Population 165
4.4 Samplesize and sampling Technique 166
4.5 Instrumentation 170
4.6 Reliability and Validity of Instrument 170
4.7 Data Collection Procedure 172
4.8 Method of Data Analysis 176
4.9 Ethical Considerations 179
4.10 Limitations of the Research Methodology 182
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS, AND
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 183
5.1 Introduction 183
5.2 Data Presentation 183
5.3 Analysis of Field Data 209
5.4 Discussion of Findings 226
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 238
6.1 Introduction 238
6.2 Summary 238
6.3 Conclusion 245
6.4 Recommendations 246
6.5 Contribution to Knowledge 249
6.6 Suggestions for Further Research 251
6.7 Limitation of the Study 251
REFERENCES 254
APPENDICES 278
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.1 Post-independence Evidences of the Use of IS-Ops in ISM in Nigeria 25
2.2 2006 to 2008 Annual Estimates of Rates of Occurrence of Homicides
and Suicides in Nigeria 42
2.3 Statistics of Occurrence of Armed Robbery, Kidnapping and other
Related Crimes in Nigeria, 2000 to 2008 59
2.4 Various Attacks by the Boko Haram Sect, 2009-2012 60
2.5 Crime rates in Nigeria, June 2006 to September 2015 66
2.6 Some of Nigerian Government’s International Involvements in
Support of Limitation of Proliferation of SALW in its Fourth Republic 79
2.7 Penalties against Contravention of the Provisions of Nigerian Firearms Act 102
3.1 Some Cases of Arrested Illegal Local Arms Producers across Nigeria, 2006 – 2011 148
3.2 Craft-produced Guns in Awka 154
3.3 Types of Weapons Technology in Nigeria, their Grades, and Products 163
4.1 Study and Target Populations of the States in the Area of Study 166
4.2 State-based Geographical Sampling Frame of the Study 166
4.3 Town and Village based Geographical Sampling Frame of the Study 167
4.4 Sampling frame for human elements of the target population 169
4.5 Field Data for Test of Reliability 324
4.6 Model Table for Presenting Statistics of Rate of Return of Questionnaire 177
5.1 Combined Rate of Return of Copies of the Distributed Questionnaire 184
5.2 Rate of Return of Valid Questionnaire Copies and Characteristics
of the Respondents among the Internal Security Agencies of the States
in the Area of Study 186
5.3 Rate of Return of Valid Questionnaire Copies and Characteristicsofthe
Respondents among the Locals of the States in the Area of Study 187
5.4 Combined Bio Data on Age, Education, and Duration of Residence
of the Research Participants in their Various Localities 188
5.5 The Types of WT and Weapons that Exist in theArea of Study 285
5.6 How the Available WT and Weapons are Acquired, Circulated, and
Used in the Area of Study 287
5.7 Traits/Peculiarities of the Local Craft-fabricators of Weapons in the Area of Study 292
5.8 Effects of Circulation of WT and Weapons on the State of IS in the Area of Study 294
5.9 How Nigerian Government Regulates Acquisition and Use of WTand
Weapons within the Country 296
5.10 Challenges of Controlling the Circulation of Weapons and WT
alongside Their Effects on Public Safety in the Area of Study 299
5.11 How the Identifiable Interplay(s) between Circulation of Weapons and WT can be Managed to Stem their Deleterious Consequences on the IS of the Area of Study 304
5.12 The Types of WT and Weapons that Exist in the Area of Study 309
5.13 How the Available WT and Weapons are Acquired, Circulated, and
Used in the Area of Study 311
5.14 Traits/Peculiarities of the Local Craft-fabricators of Weapons in
the Area of Study 314
5.15 Effects of Circulation of WT and Weapons on the State of IS inthe
Area of Study 315
5.16 How Nigerian Government Regulates Acquisition and Use of WT and
Weapons within the Country 316
5.17 Challenges of Controlling the Circulation of Weapons and WT
alongside Their Effects on Public Safety in the Area of Study 318
5.18 How the Identifiable Interplay(s) between Circulation of Weapons and WT can be Managed to Stem their Deleterious Consequences on the IS of the Area of Study 320
5.19 Data on the Types of WT and Weapons that Exist in theArea of Study 199
5.20 Data on How the Available WT and Weapons are Acquired, Circulated, and Used in the Area of Study 200
5.21 Data on the Traits or Peculiarities of the Local Craft-fabricators of
Weapons in the Area of Study 200
5.22 Data on the Effects of Circulation of WT and Weapons on the State of IS in the Area of Study 201
5.23 Data on How Nigerian Government Regulates Acquisition and Use of
WT and Weapons within the Country 201
5.24 Data on the Challenges of Controlling the Circulation of WT and
Weaponsalongside their Effects on Public Safety in the Area of Study 202
5.25 Data on How the Identifiable Interplays between Circulation of WT
and Weapons can be Managed to Stem their Deleterious Consequences
on the IS of the Area of Study 203
5.26 Comprehensive Data from the Valid Questionnaire Copies Retrieved
from the Field 322
5.27 Summary of the Tests of the Contribution of Illegal Local Craft-
Production of Weapons to Proliferation of Weapons in Nigeria 225
5.28 Summary of the Tests of the Effects of WT on ISP in Nigeria 226
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
2.1 Crime fatalities per state in 2016 66
2.2 Crime rates in Nigeria (homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, June 2006 and 31st June 2011) 68
APPENDICES
Appendix
I Informed Consent Form
II Interview Guide
III Questionnaire for the Study
IV The Types of WT and Weapons that Exist in the Area of Study
V How the Available WT and Weapons are Acquired, Circulated, and Used in the Area of Study
VI Traits/Peculiarities of the Local Craft-fabricators of Weapons in the Area of Study
VII Effects of Circulation of WT and Weapons on the State of IS in the Area of Study
VIII How Nigerian Government Regulates Acquisition and Use of WT and Weapons within the Country
IX Challenges of Controlling the Circulation of Weapons and WT alongside their Effects on Public Safety in the Area of Study
X How the Identifiable Interplay(s) between Circulation of Weapons and WT can be Managed to Stem their Deleterious Consequences on the IS of the Area of Study
XI The Types of WT and Weapons that Exist in the Area of Study
XII How the Available WT and Weapons are Acquired, Circulated, and Used in the Area of Study
XIII Traits/Peculiarities of the Local Craft-fabricators of Weapons in the Area of Study
XIV Effects of Circulation of WT and Weapons on the State of IS in the Area of Study
XV How Nigerian Government Regulates Acquisition and Use of WT and Weapons within the Country
XVI Challenges of Controlling the Circulation of Weapons and WT alongside Their Effects on Public Safety in the Area of Study
Appendix
XVII How the Identifiable Interplay(s) between Circulation of Weapons and WT can be Managed to Stem their Deleterious Consequences on the IS of the Area of Study
XVIII Comprehensive Data from the Valid Questionnaire Copies Retrieved from the Field
XIX Field Data for Test of Reliability
XX Relics of the Products of the Biafran War Machine, 1967 – 1970
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Technical know-how for construction of weapons, either by means of handcrafting or through industrial production, is the most significant cause of massive availability and proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the world. The latter inversely correlates with internal security (IS) of most countries. As weapons technologies (WTs) increase in sophistication and circulation, so do the production and circulation of SALW and their ammunitions to and fro “legitimate” and “illegitimate” handlers. Thus, development, improvement, dispersal, and use of WTs have remained double-edged swords: The resultant weapons often simultaneously provide security and insecurity, across human societies. As weapons are used to protect lives and properties, and to ensure safe environments for people to live and function in, so are they sometimes used to destabilize the society, making it unsafe for human habitation and functionality. The people in possession of WTs and their products at any time often strongly determine the roles that WTs and weapons play in the society: While “legitimate” possessors may use them to protect the society and its elements, “illegitimate” possessors often use them to cause havoc in the society (Okafor, Okeke & Aniche, 2012; Chuma-Okoro, 2011).
Since the earliest incidence of WTs and crafting in human societies, weapons (especially SALW) have often been handled by “legitimate” and “illegitimate” users. All efforts made by state authorities to regulate possession and use of WTs and weapons have often been tangibly undermined. In some societies, circulation of WTs and weapons has been very minimal while in many others, it has been very severe (Edeko, 2011; Small Arms Survey, 2007). With only a few countries (including but not limited to Britain, China, and France) being able to reasonably control indiscriminate circulation of WTs and weapons, only the said few have been able to achieve relative IS and peace that is reasonable; such countries mainly include the developed countries of the world. The developing countries like most of the Asian and African countries often face lots of violent internal conflicts and crises emanating from inadequate regulation of WTs and weapons (Edeko, 2011; Abdel-Fatau, 2004).
In this era of highly globalised world, the Internet and the associated social media have often been used to circumvent the regulation of WTs more than ever before. Massive transmission of information through the Internet and the social media have unduly enhanced circulation of WTs thereby preventing them from being exclusive preserves of the military industry and government security agencies. With the Internet, any technical enthusiast can now easily access blueprints of weapons building or related resource documents. In addition to that, interested person(s) can receive technical supports from many online sources. With these factors in place, local craftsmen now have the opportunity of improving on their skills of craft-production of weapons. Also, opportunities now exist for them to try out newer methods of fabrication of their regular and ‘newer’ weapons. Consequently, interested craftsmen everywhere in the world have either learnt, or developed their already acquired, art of weapons fabrication and have been producing SALW for various reasons and purposes (Onuoha, 2006 cited in Edeko, 2011). This situation has progressively contributed to geometric rise in IS challenges, which have often been underreported, for many countries (Small Arms Survey, 2007).
The types of weapons most frequently used to destabilize IS of many societies are not those originally known as weapons of mass destruction – nuclear and atomic bombs, biological and chemical weapons. Rather the most destructive weapons since the demise of the Cold War have been the SALW. This is because of the relative ease with which they can be produced, moved or carried, proliferated, and operated (Nte, 2011; Obuoforibo, 2010; UN Document A/52/228, 27 August, 1997). Proliferations of these weapons sourced through trade, local crafting, reverse engineering, theft, renting, and all sorts of illegal supplies, have been on the rise. The rapid and unwanted circulation of SALW has reached alarming rates in many Third World countries, especially since the end of the Cold War. Thus, there have been rising cases of internal insecurity in the developing parts of the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989 to 1991). The countries worst hit by the said phenomena have been the badly divided societies which are faulted along ethnic, religious, economic, and political cleavages like Nigeria.
In spite of the fact that SALW do not necessarily cause conflicts, their massive availability promotes fresh engagement in and or sustenance of existing violent contentions. They have been the tools for executing various kinds of violent crimes – armed robbery, political assassination, kidnapping or abduction, prison violation, petroleum pipeline vandalism, oil theft (bunkering), and intimidation of all kinds. They have also served well in intergroup clashes like intra- and inter- ethnic conflicts in which violence is perceived to be necessary for successful intimidation and defeat of opponents (Religions for Peace, African Council of Religious Leaders, 2010).
All of the above IS challenges have been experienced and are still on-going in contemporary Nigeria. In Nigeria, especially since the end of military rule in 1999, there has been increasing rates of weapons-related violence with attendant speculation of high rising circulation of SALW within the country. These occurrences have been attributed to many factors like opportunistic venting of bottled-up vexations of the military era by various groups in Nigeria (Egbefo & Salihu, 2014; Albert, 2012), corruption of government officials (Orikpe, 2013; Adebakin and Raimi, 2012), and use of extreme violence by the government to quell internal crises (Adekunle, 2013; Babatunde; 2010; Omotola, 2010). Other alleged causes include selfish attitudes of national politicians (Adebakin and Raimi, 2012; Kasali, 2011; Hazen & Horner, 2007); poor handling of sensitive conflict phenomena (Azinge, 2013; Thom-Otuya, 2009); fear and the need for personal and group security within the citizenry (Hazen and Horner; 2007); and ethnic, religious, and political intolerances (Dode, 2012; Sen, 1999). Whatever the causes may have been, the incidence of the various forms of violent acts in Nigeria has been rising from strength to strength and from simplistic occurrences to very complex forms. So, lives and property have been unprotected with stability unguaranteed in the country. Internal security of Nigeria has been so threatened that the apparatuses of the state currently seem to be incapable of providing public safety for Nigeria and its citizenry.
As a corollary to the foregoing, then, one aspect of the national interests in which the Nigerian State has often failed to achieve its goals is in providing sustainable IS for its citizenry. The worst experience with this national inability was the Nigerian Civil War, taking into account the various pre-1967 massacres and the worsening incidence of the war (1967 to 1970). Being that proliferation and illegal use of SALW have been aiding IS challenges in Nigeria, this study sought to explore the contributions of WT to proliferation of SALW and the observed IS situations of Nigeria in order to contribute to making the country a safer society.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The re-emergence of civilian rule in Nigeria in May 1999, after about 30 intermittent years of military rule, was accompanied by a situation of ever increasing IS challenges which have been limiting internal security provisioning (ISP) in the country (Ogbuzor, 2011; Alozieuwa, 2010; Allen & Okeke-Uzodike, 2010; Ishaku, 2009). Some of the IS challenges have included incessant crimes like armed robbery, kidnapping, oil bunkering, ethno-religious clashes, ethnic militia cum government clashes, politically motivated killings, government ordered genocide, indiscriminate murder of unarmed civilians by state security agents, proliferation of SALW, and acts of terrorism.
