CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1Â Â Â Â Background To The Study
Teachers have been regarded as having a significant impact on the educational system. Both students, parents, teachers, principals and even casual observers concur to this fact. Â Teachers, according to Hanushek (2002), are perhaps the most significant school component influencing students’ achievement. As a result, teachers strive to make the greatest potential difference in student learning. As a result, rules and procedures governing where and how teachers work must reflect the value of teachers in the educational process. This indicates that initiatives that improve the quantity and equal distribution of teachers who support high rates of learning must be implemented. In light of this, some relevant authorities focus on enhancing teachers’ skills through training (Hill, “2007), while others focus on teacher recruiting tactics, particularly in private schools (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff and Wyckoff, 2007). Teachers’ performance at the local, state, and national levels, on the other hand, is increased by incentives.
Furthermore, this method is supported by two action theories. One argues that incentives matter, since teachers would be more effective if they were rewarded for their work. The second is that, because present compensation or remuneration systems do not distinguish amongst teachers based on criteria other than length of service and courses completed, adding compensation-based methods of recognizing and rewarding achievement might make teaching a more appealing career option.
Furthermore, teacher incentive programs are regulations that clearly relate teachers remuneration to the success of their students. Such programs were very uncommon until the 1990s, but they have grown considerably more widespread in the following 15 years, mostly in the United States. They often give yearly merit pay ranging from 10% to 40% of an average teacher’s monthly compensation (American Federation of Teachers, 2000). Furthermore, teacher incentive programs have been launched in other nations. For example, in Israel, teachers are compensated based on student achievement (Lavy, 2002), while a World Bank-funded initiative in Mexico compensates primary school teachers based on student performance.
In line with the aforementioned, proponents of teacher incentive programs have pointed out that teachers now face inadequate incentives, with compensation decided nearly completely by educational attainment, training, and experience, rather than performance, particularly in developing nations (Harbison and Hanushek, 2002; Hanushek, Kain & Steven, 1998; Hanushek, 1996; Lockheed and Verspoor, 20 11).
In Nigeria, for instance, teacher incentives are often relatively low. High rates of teacher absenteeism and a low turnover rate in the profession are evidences of this. Teachers absenteeism is usually high in schools with poor teacher salary, according to Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremmer, Muralidharan, and Roger (2006). Similarly, Bias and Kremer (2003) report a 27 percent teacher absence rate in Nigerian rural primary schools. Even when the teachers are present at school, they are not always in the classroom. Given this circumstance, teachers of teacher incentives appear to have a better case in underdeveloped nations like Nigeria than in developed countries, owing to the environment’s extremely weak incentives (Jacobson, 2005). As a result, this study investigates the relationships between incentive packages and secondary school teacher performance.
1.2Â Â Â Â Statement Of The Problem
Over the years, the majority of teacher complaints have always stemmed from the school system’s lack of functioning and efficient incentive programs (Onyeka, 2014). On this topic, Jonson (2012) highlighted that the lack of suitable incentive packages in Nigerian schools facilitates teachers’ deviant attitude toward school, as seen by excessive absenteeism and non-commitment to effective instruction of students. As a result, it is extremely unusual for teachers, particularly in public institutions, to cover the work schedule, while slow learners no longer receive individualized education (additional attention) unless money is provided privately to the teacher. As a result, the additional lesson syndrome for more income has become popular in both public and private institutions (Perricus, 2016). As a result of all of these issues, both the instructor and the students demonstrated poor performance, low morale, restlessness, and deviant behavior. As a result of this, students’ poor performance in examinations (SSCE, NECO, and JAMB) and the deteriorating standard of education in society are becoming more problematic than ever, owing to the instillation of bribery, corruption, and other malpractices in the school system facilitated by teachers in order to earn more. Based on the aforementioned, this study is designed to identify the correlations between incentive packages and secondary school teacher performance.
