Hume’s Conception of Character

Most commentators have paid no attention to the many things Hume says about traits of character. Those few who have discussed his account of character have done so only insofar as it bears on his theory of virtue, of moral evaluation, or of moral responsibility, and have had no interest in it for its own sake. This situation is regrettable for several reasons. For one thing, an original and suggestive theory of character, proposed by a major philosopher of the social sciences, has not received the philosophical scrutiny and criticism it deserves. For another, uncritical assumptions about Hume’s conception of character have given rise to the most extraordinary misconceptions about his views on virtue, evaluation, and responsibility. For a third, the failure to examine Hume’s views on character has prevented a better understanding of many of the central doctrines in his philosophy as a whole. As I hope shall become apparent as we proceed, the study of Hume on character has the very salutary effect of raising serious difficulties for some of the most entrenched and time-honored interpretations of his views on causation, explanation, personal identity, the relation of mind and body, substance, perception, and the physical world, as well as on the topics in moral philosophy already mentioned. In this paper, however, I shall make no systematic attempt to work out the ramifications of Hume’s theory of character for these other areas of his philosophy. Apart from a few suggestions for possible investigations, this project must wait for another occasion. In the present paper my chief purpose is simply to sketch in the main lines of Hume’s theory of character itself. It must be noted at the outset that when discussing personal evaluations Hume makes some attempt to blur the distinction between traits of character and other “mental qualities,”1 (T,575) including intellectual abilities. Mental qualities “are not altogether of the same kind,” he says, but from the standpoint of evaluation “.